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The source selection decision in a competitively
negotiated acquisition is very difficult. Cost realism is
one evaluation factor that may be used to assist in making
the source selection decision. In this study the concept
of cost realism and feasible methodologies for achieving it
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reviewed and discussed. Cost realism utilization in the
Department of the Navy is investigated. The study
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The source selection decision in a competitively
negotiated acquisition that will result in award of a cost
reimbursable contract is very difficult. The contracting
officer or designated source selection authority must:
. . .ensure selection of the source whose proposal has the
highest degree of realism and whose performance is
expected to best meet stated government requirements.
[Ref. l:p. 15-19]
The selection of the proposal with the highest degree
of realism and performance is judgemental on the part of
the contracting officer or source selection authority. The
selection is based on a careful evaluation of the factors
that make up the proposal. Additionally, the Federal
Acquisition Regulation (FAR) identifies other evaluation
factors that may be considered which include cost realism,
technical excellence, management capability, personnel
qualifications, experience, past performance, schedule and
other relevant factors.
In procuring products or services, the preferred method
is to issue an Invitation for Bid (IFB) that completely
identifies the product or service desired. A Firm Fixed
Price (FFP) contract award is then made to the offeror of
the bid that offers the lowest cost. This method of
procurement works best for products and services for which
performance and/or design specifications are firm and more
than one supplier is willing and capable of providing the
product or service. When design or performance
specifications are not firm, as in the case of research and
development or engineering services procurements, there is
a high degree of performance, schedule and cost risk.
To compensate for these risks in a fixed price contract
environment, the contractor will include costs for
additional labor, material, overhead and profit. If the
additional cost items are not utilized during contract
performance, the contractor keeps the additional costs as
increased profit. If the contractor is unable to deliver
the required product or services within the contract price,
the contractor will suffer a loss that may be severe enough
to force the contractor to default on the contract. Both
of these situations, excess profit or termination for
default, are considered unacceptable to the government.
For procurements with risk levels that are considered
unacceptable for fixed price contracts, the government
assumes the risk by awarding a cost reimbursable contract.
This type of contract requires the government to reimburse
all of the contractor's allowable and allocable costs
incurred during contract performance. Choosing a contract
source for a cost reimbursable contract award is not as
simple and easy as for a fixed price contract award. To
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make a contract award in this situation based entirely upon
the lowest proposed cost would be unrealistic, since the
final cost of performance may bear no resemblance to the
original proposed cost. Additionally, the award of a cost
reimbursable contract obligates the government to reimburse
the contractor's allowable and allocable costs. Large
increases in cost during a contract's performance seriously
undermine both the Congress ' and public ' s faith in the Navy
and significantly impairs the Navy's planning, programming
and budgeting system. The use of cost realism as an
evaluation factor in the source selection process could
provide some degree of assurance that proposed costs are
realistic and defensible.
B. OBJECTIVE OF THE RESEARCH
The objective of this study is to explore how the
source selection process evaluates contractor proposals for
cost realism and how it utilizes this evaluation in source
selection.
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
To achieve the objective of the research the following
question was posed:
Can the cost realism concept be used to improve the
source selection process?
To answer the basic research question, the following
subsidiary questions were asked:
1. What is cost realism?
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2.
At what points and under what circumstances may cost
realism become an issue in the source selection
process?
3. How can cost realism best be utilized in the source
selection process?
D. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The information presented in this research was obtained
from currently available procurement related literature and
personal interviews with contracting officers and program
management office personnel. Literature was obtained from
the Naval Postgraduate School Library, Defense Technical
Information Center, and Defense Logistics Studies
Information Exchange. Applicable regulations, directives,
and instructions that govern the acquisition process were
utilized. Personnel interviewed during the research effort
are identified in the List of References.
E. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS
This research is limited to cost realism issues and
policies associated with major weapons systems acquisitions
in the Department of the Navy (DoN). The thrust of the
research was on developing an understanding of the cost
realism issues present in the source selection process and
how these issues are recognized and dealt with by the
contracting officer, Source Selection Evaluation Board
(SSEB), Source Selection Advisory Council (SSAC), and
Source Selection Authority (SSA).
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F. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY
This thesis is organized to provide the reader with an
examination of the cost realism concept and a basic
understanding of its role in the source selection
decision. The thesis is divided into the following
chapters:
1. Chapter II introduces the concept of cost realism
through a discussion of the source selection environment
and the source selection process leading up to the
definition of cost realism.
2. Chapter III reviews and discusses where and when
cost realism issues are specifically addressed during the
source selection process.
3. Chapter IV discusses how cost realism is utilized
in the Department of the Navy.
4. Chapter V summarizes the results of the research,
provides conclusions and recommendations developed as a
result of this study and provides recommendations for
further study.
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II. THE COST REALISM CONCEPT IN PERSPECTIVE
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter examines the concept of cost realism and
brings it into perspective. The framework for
investigation of cost realism is initiated by a discussion
of the source selection environment and the source
selection process. Next, the roles of cost and price in
the source selection process are discussed. Finally, the
cost realism concept is defined, and considerations are
presented to demonstrate its position and role within the
overall process.
B. THE SOURCE SELECTION ENVIRONMENT
Major weapon systems are acquired by the Department of
the Navy to provide hardware resources to operational
forces enabling them to achieve operational objectives in
their support of national policies and objectives.
Major weapons systems are developed to fulfill a
mission need. Mission need could be the result of advances
in technology that render a current weapon system obsolete
or advancement of enemy capabilities beyond current
defensive capabilities. No matter what the reason for
development of a major weapon system, several similarities
are present in almost all new major weapon systems
14
acquisitions. First, the weapon system begins as a concept
that utilizes the latest in technological advances and in
some cases, utilizes technology that is still under
development. Second, successful research, development,
test and evaluation (RDT&E) of a technologically advanced
major weapon system can involve many unkown factors and
their attendant risks. Third, the government must carry
most, if not all, of the cost risk associated with major
weapon system development through the award of a cost
reimbursable contract.
The cost of a major weapon system is often measured in
hundreds of millions or billions of dollars. When there is
more than one source available to develop and manufacture
the major weapon system, the resulting competition may be
fierce and highly competitive. There is usually much more
at stake than the profit and loss statement of a single
contractor. Thousands of jobs could be at risk, not only
with the primary contractor, but with sub-contractors and
other "trickle-down economy" business in the surrounding
communities. Additionally, local governments, special
interest groups and congressional interests are always
aroused whenever a government action has the potential for
major impact on the economy, environment or votes.
There is a large amount of pressure involved in the
acquisition of a major weapon system. There is pressure on
the program manager to develop an affordable, reliable and
15
technologically advanced system on time and under budget.
There is pressure on the contractors to win the system
award competition and keep profits and jobs secure. There
is pressure on the contracting officer or source selection
authority to procure the system from responsible sources at
fair and reasonable prices calculated to result in the
lowest ultimate cost to the government.
The very real result of this pressure, when coupled
with the technical, schedule and cost risks involved, could
be the award and development of a major weapon system based
on an unrealistic proposal.
C. THE SOURCE SELECTION PROCESS
Source selection is the process wherein the
requirements, facts, recommendations and government
policies relevant to an award decision in a competitive
procurement of a system are examined, and the source
selection decision is made. Source selection procedures
are designed to:
(a) maximize competition
(b) minimize the complexity of the solicitation,
evaluation, and the selection decision
(c) ensure impartial and comprehensive evaluation of
offerors' proposals and
(d) ensure selection of the source whose proposal has the
highest degree of realism and whose performance is
expected to best meet stated Government requirements.
[Ref. l:p. 15-19]
These procedures are not only good business, but are
also in keeping with the responsibilities inherent within
the stewardship of public monies and trust.
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The determination of those factors and attributes which
identify a responsible source, as well as how a fair and
reasonable price can be accurately calculated, has been,
and remains today, a difficult problem for DoD to resolve.
Deputy Secretary of Defense Carlucci recognized this
problem when he reported that:
Some DoD competitively-selected contractors have
performed poorly. In some instances, source selection
criteria do not sufficiently take into account past
performance or plans for future phases of a program.
Also, the credibility and realism of contractor cost
proposals are not always challenged. [Ref. 2:p. 38]
Failures in the DoD source selection process can easily
result in unanticipated program cost growth which can then
lead to budgetary shortfalls or schedule slippage due to
inadequate funding. Additionally, when it becomes
necessary to fix the blame, which it almost invariably
does, the resultant finger pointing, accusations,
counter-accusations, congressional hearings, Inspector
General and General Accounting Office investigations and
audits can result in either program redirection, reduction
or cancellation. There is also the very real possibility
for additional statutory or regulatory guidance being added
to the already overwhelming and overburdened acquisition
system.
The Department of Defense recognized the problems
associated with inadequate source selection decisions when
17
it issued Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 4105.62,
Selection of Contractual Sources for Major Defense Systems
,
establishing detailed guidelines for the management of the
source selection process.
As part of the policy which governs the solicitation,
evaluation and source selection process, DODD 4105.62
states:
1. The prime objectives of the process are to (a)
select the source whose proposal has the highest degree
of realism and credibility and whose performance is
expected to best meet Government objectives at an
affordable cost; (b) assure impartial, equitable, and
comprehensive evaluation of competitors' proposals and
related capabilities; and (c) maximize efficiency and
minimize complexity of solicitation, evaluation and the
selection decision.
2. Each DoD component shall develop, and
consistently apply, procedures which create the
environment for an impartial, balanced and realistic
appraisal of all proposals submitted.
The prime objectives of the source selection process
are therefore in keeping with Defense Acquisition
Regulations (DAR) policy to procure from responsible
sources at fair and reasonable prices.
The source selection process as currently established
requires an evaluation of the contractor's proposal and the
capability of the contractor to successfully accomplish the
program under consideration.
The primary goal of evaluation is to determine, for
each competitor, the most likely outcome in terms of
system characteristics, costs (development, production,
and support), and schedules. .. .The evaluation should give
consideration to each industrial competitor's assessment
of the technical and financial risks involved and the
credibility of proposed approaches to eliminate, avoid or
minimize those risks.... [Ref. 3:p. 6]
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This evaluation process is conducted in four steps:
Step 1. Separate technical proposals shall be solicited
and evaluated. . .
.
Step 2. A cost/price proposal shall then be
obtained. .. together with any necessary revisions to correct
deficiencies in the technical proposals. . .the competitive range
will be established. . .meaningful discussions will be held with
the remaining offerors....
Step 3. Following such discussions, a common cutoff date
for the receipt of final revisions to technical and cost/price
submittals will be established. . .after receipt of any revised
submittals, the proposals shall be evaluated based upon the
offeror's total proposal and a contractor selected for
negotiation of the contract.
Step 4. A definitive contract will then be negotiated with
the selected offeror. [Ref. 3:p. 7]
D. THE ROLES OF COST AND PRICE IN THE SOURCE SELECTION
PROCESS
1 . Definitions
In the source selection process, the determination
of estimates for cost and price for a weapon system may
become a point where the government and contractor take
divergent courses. It becomes necessary, therefore, to
define the terms frequently used in developing the
estimates for cost and price:
a. "Cost Analysis" is the review and evaluation of the
separate cost elements and proposed profit of (a) an
offeror's or contractor's cost or pricing data and
(b) the judgmental factors applied in projecting from
the data to the estimated costs, in order to form an
opinion on the degree to which the proposed costs
represent what the contract should cost, assuming
reasonable economy and efficiency. [Ref. l:p. 15-25]
b. "Cost or Pricing data" means all facts as of the time
of price agreement that prudent buyers and sellers
would reasonably expect to affect price negotiations
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significantly. Cost or Pricing data are factual, not
judgmental, and are therefore verifiable. While they
do not indicate the accuracy of the prospective
contractor's judgment about estimated future costs or
projections, they do include the data forming the
basis for that judgment. Cost or Pricing data are
more than historical accounting data; they are all
the facts that can be reasonably expected to
contribute to the soundness of estimates of future
costs and to the validity of determinations of costs
already incurred. They also include such factors as
(a) vendor quotations; (b) nonrecurring costs; (c)
information on changes in production methods and in
production or purchasing volume; (d) data supporting
projections of business prospects and objectives and
related operations costs; (e) unit-cost trends such
as those associated with labor efficiency; (f)
make-or-buy decisions; (g) estimated resources to
attain business goals; and (h) information on
management decisions that could have a significant
bearing on costs. [Ref. l:p. 15-25]
c. "Price" is the cost plus any fee or profit applicable
to the contract type. [Ref. l:p. 15-26]
d. "Price Analysis" is the process of examining and
evaluating a proposed price without evaluating its
separate cost elements and proposed profit. [Ref. 1:
p. 15-26]
e. "Should-Cost Analysis" is a specialized form of cost
analysis employing an integrated team of government
contracting, contract administration, pricing, audit,
and engineering representatives. It differs from
regular cost analysis in its depth, in the fact that
it is conducted at the contractor's plant, and in the
extent to which the Government identifies and
challenges inefficiencies in the contractor's
management and operations rather than merely
challenging certain proposed costs. The purpose of
should-cost analysis is to (1) identify uneconomical
or inefficient practices in the contractor's
management and operations, (2) quantify their impact
on cost in order to develop a realistic price
objective for negotiation, and (3) lead to both short
and long-range improvements in the contractor '
s
economy and efficiency. [Ref. l:p. 15-39]
d. "Proposal Evaluation" is an assessment of both the
proposal and the offeror's ability (as conveyed by
the proposal) to successfully accomplish the
prospective contract. [Ref. l:p. 15-21]
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2. The Roles
Before a weapon system can reach the source
selection stage, the estimated cost of the weapon system
has played a key role in the planning, programming and
budgeting process. There is the strong possibility that
Congressional authorization and appropriation for the
weapon system was based on the estimated cost as much as it
was based on the need for the systems' capabilities.
The program manager must ensure that only realistic
cost and budget information is provided and that such
information is accurate and complete. Cost estimates must
include the full anticipated development, production and
operational costs associated with the program, even though
this task is especially difficult at program initiation.
The estimates support budgeting and early funding for
testing, budgeting for most likely costs, budgeting for
technical and scheduling risks, capitalization of
production and specialized operational facilities and
independent cost analysis. [Ref. 4:p. 1-9]
FAR requires price or cost to the government be
included as an evaluation factor in every source
selection. Other evaluation factors previously identified
that may apply to a particular acquisition are cost
realism, technical excellence, management capability,
personnel qualifications, experience, past performance,
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schedule and other relevant factors. The estimated cost of
the contractor's proposal will certainly be a factor in the
evaluation process. Cost is a driving factor throughout
the system acquisition process, but it must be put in
perspective.
In the development stage, the prime concern is to
find and engage contractors who have the conceptual
ideas, manpower, management expertise, facilities, and
the demonstrated experience to develop a system capable
of meeting the mission need. Cost estimates in the
earlier stages of the acquisition process are far from
precise, and independent estimates of development and
Life Cycle Costs (LCC) by an inhouse activity are needed
to establish a baseline against which to evaluate the
validity of contractor cost estimates. With due regard
for its significance, cost is a controllable element
which can be managed through carefully drawn, properly
executed contracts and through liberal use of competition
throughout the acquisition process. The cost to develop
a system is only one part, albeit an important one, of
the system LCC. Costs incurred in development can return
large dividends in the form of lower production and
maintenance costs as well as in improved performance.
[Ref. 4:p. 4-40]
While the lowest price or lowest total cost to the
government is properly the deciding factor in many source
selections, in certain acquisitions the government may
select the source whose proposal offers the greatest value
to the government in terms of performance and other
factors.
In awarding a cost-reimbursement contract, the cost
proposal should not be controlling, since advance
estimates of cost may not be valid indicators for final
actual costs. There is no requirement that
cost-reimbursement contracts be awarded on the basis of
lowest proposed cost, lowest proposed fee or the lowest
total proposed cost plus fee. The award of
cost-reimbursement contracts primarily on the basis of
estimated costs may encourage the submission of
22
unrealistically low estimates and increase the likelihood
of cost overruns. [Ref. l:p. 15-20]




Cost is a key factor in the source selection
process. It may not be the most important factor, but its
importance cannot be overlooked. The determination of a
weapon systems' estimated cost through cost analysis is a
judgemental decision. The decision may be influenced by
optimism or pessimism toward any one or more of the factors
which go into making up the total estimated cost.
Traditionally, contractors have the tendency to lean toward
optimism in cost estimation and the government has the
tendency to lean toward pessimism. However, this is not
always the rule, and situations do occur where the opposite
may happen. Therefore, the methodology by which a
contractor's cost proposal is evaluated to determine
whether it is reasonable, realistic, credible and
defensible becomes an important issue.
2 Cost Realism Defined
Cost realism may be defined as the methodology by
which a contractor's cost proposal is evaluated during the
source selection process to determine with some degree of
accuracy and fairness whether or not it is a realistic
estimate of what the actual costs are expected to be,
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assuming no change in the government ' s requirements or the
contractor's technical approach.
3. Considerations
FAR requires price or cost be included as an
evaluation factor in every source selection, but an
optional cost realism evaluation may be made at the
discretion of agency acquisition officials. There is no
definitive guidance in statutes or regulations for the
conduct of a cost realism evaluation; however, there are a
variety of cost analysis elements and techniques that may
be used to determine the realism of proposed costs. When
cost realism is included as an evaluation factor, the
informed judgement rule requires the contracting officer or
source selection authority make an analysis of proposed
costs sufficient to make a supportable judgment that the
costs proposed are realistic.
F . SUMMARY
This chapter provided a broad overview of the source
selection environment and process for major weapon system
acquisition. The complexity and cost of a major weapon
system and the resultant economic impact on competition
winners and losers makes the source selection decision very
important.
The evaluation of a proposal to determine its degree of
realism requires a thorough analysis of every element which
makes up the proposal. Cost is a required evaluation
24
factor and may become the controlling factor; therefore, a
determination of the realism of proposed costs becomes a
required evaluation factor.
By this analogy, an evaluation of cost realism becomes
required; however, its methodology is not defined in
statute or regulation. This chapter presented a definition
of cost realism as an evaluation factor in the source
selection decision process.
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III. COST REALISM ISSUES DURING SOURCE SELECTION
A. INTRODUCTION
It is the purpose of this chapter to review and discuss
where and when cost realism issues are specifically
addressed during the source selection process. For
purposes of discussion, the chapter divides the source
selection process into three parts. Part 1 encompasses all
steps leading up to the release of the solicitation. Part 2
covers proposal evaluation. Part 3 addresses the source
selection decision. Additionally, this chapter briefly
addresses the issue of cost realism based protests.
B. PLANNING FOR COST REALISM
1. The Source Selection Plan Groundwork
When an acquisition objective has been established,
an acquisition plan is prepared that addresses the
acquisition process which will be followed to achieve the
desired objective.
A key part of the acquisition planning process is
the source selection plan. The source selection plan, as a
minimum, includes:
(1) A description of the organization structure
(2) Proposed presolicitation activities
(3) A summary of the acquisition strategy
(4) A statement of the proposed evaluation factors and
their relative importance
(5) A description of the evaluation process, methodology
26
and techniques to be used and
(6) A schedule of significant milestones. [Ref. l:p. 15-23]
2. The Solicitation
The solicitation is the method by which the
government's requirements are conveyed to potential
contractors either as a Request for Proposal (RFP) or as a
Request for Quotation (RFQ).
Solicitations shall contain the information necessary to
enable prospective contractors to prepare proposals....
[Ref. l:p. 15-10]
The solicitation is prepared using the uniform
contract format which facilitates preparation of both the
solicitation and the contract. The principal difference
between the solicitation and the contract is the inclusion
of Part IV, Representations and Instructions , in the
Solicitation. Part IV contains section K, Representations
,
Certifications and Other Statements of Offerors or Quoters
,
Section L, Instructions, Conditions and Notices to Offerors
or Quoters and Section M, Evaluation Factors for Award . It
is in Part IV, Sections L and M, that cost realism issues
are first addressed.
Section L contains:
...solicitation provisions and other information and
instructions not required elsewhere to guide offerors or
quoters in preparing proposals or quotations. [Ref. l:p.
15-12]
It is in this section that detailed guidance is
provided for the submission of technical and cost or
pricing data. The level of detail required is that which
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is considered necessary for complete technical and cost
analysis of the proposal. This routinely requires
submission of technical and cost data in Work Breakdown
Structure (WBS) format. In this way, cost and technical
comparisons can be made between different offerors for the
same WBS elements, and greater cost visiblity can be
provided where considered necessary.
Section M, of the solicitation:
...shall clearly state the evaluation factors, including
price or cost and any significant subfactors, that will
be considered in making the source selection and their
relative importance. Numerical weights, which may be
employed in the evaluation of proposals, need not be
disclosed in solicitation. [Ref. l:p. 15-20]
However, it is necessary to:
...state the relative importance the government places on
those evalutation factors and subfactors. [Ref. l:p.
15-12]
This is performed by identifying minimum
requirements that apply to particular evaluation factors
and significant subfactors.
C. THE PROPOSAL EVALUATION
Proposal evaluation is an assessment of both the
proposal and offeror's ability (as conveyed by the
proposal) to successfully accomplish the prospective
contract. An agency shall evaluate competitive proposals
solely on the factors specified in the solicitation.
[Ref. l:p. 15-21]
The proposal evaluation factors normally specified
in the solicitation are technical, cost and management
capability. Other factors included for evaluation
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purposes may include personnel qualifications, past
performance, reliability and maintainability and schedule.
For cost realism purposes, the primary evaluation factors
which require careful and complete analysis are technical
and cost.
1. Technical Analysis
The purpose of the technical analysis is to assess
the offeror's ability to accomplish the minimum technical
requirements. The analysis looks at the types and
quantities of labor proposed, bills of material, proposed
sub-contracts, proposed technical approach, assumptions of
technical risk and other pertinent technical elements.
Based on the results of the technical analysis, a summary,
matrix or quantitative ranking of each technical proposal




Methodologies for conducting cost analysis may
differ depending upon what is being procured and who is
conducting the cost analysis. However, the basic goal of
cost analysis remains the formation of:
. .an opinion on the degree to which the proposed costs
represent what the contract should cost, assuming
reasonable economy and efficiency. [Ref. l:p. 15-25]
The government's opinion on costs usually takes the
form of a government estimate of the most likely cost which
will be incurred by the offeror in fulfilling the terms and
conditions of the contract.
29
3. Overall Analysis
While conducting technical and cost analyses,
questions invariably arise with regard to the technical or
cost elements being proposed. These questions are provided
to the offeror who responds with the necessary
substantiating documentation. The government must exercise
great care in pre-award discussions with offerors to avoid
providing technical or cost information about competing
proposals or appearing to direct technical or cost changes
in the proposal. Overt technical and cost leveling is a
prohibited practice, but pre-award discussions frequently
have the effect of seeing differing proposals move closer
together in certain technical or cost areas. This can have
the effect of bringing the higher weighted technical scores
of competent offerors closer together and cause the lower
weighted cost score to become more important than
originally intended.
4. Cost Realism Scoring
After the technical and cost analysis have been
completed, the proposal is evaluated and scored for cost
realism in accordance with the cost realism scoring plan
established as a part of the source selection plan. There
are differing methods for scoring cost realism, with no one
method being clearly superior. The one similarity all
methods seem to share is their use of the government cost
30
estimate developed during cost analysis as the baseline
against which the proposal is evaluated and scored.
D. SOURCE SELECTION
The source selection decision is made by the source
selection authority using the evaluation process,
methodology and techniques established in the source
selection plan.
The Source Selection Authority shall consider any
rankings and ratings, and, if requested, any
recommendations prepared by evaluation and advisory
groups. [Ref. l:p. 15-23]
In practice, the evaluation of a proposal is normally
performed by the Source Selection Evaluation Board (SSEB)
in accordance with the evaluation factors and process
established in the solicitation and source selection plan.
It is the SSEB that evaluates and scores proposals for cost
realism.
The results of the proposal evaluations by the SSEB are
then provided to the Source Selection Advisory Council
(SSAC) for review. The SSAC will review the evaluation
efforts of the SSEB and request clarification or further
evaluation as required. When all evaluations have been
satisfactorily completed, the SSAC will compare the
evaluation results between the competing proposals. When
the SSAC is finished comparing evaluation results, a
recommendation of a source for selection is prepared with
supporting documentation for forwarding to the SSA.
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The supporting documentation prepared for the selection
decision shall show the relative differences among
proposals and their strengths, weaknesses and risks in
terms of the evaluation factors. The supporting
documentation shall include the basis and reason for the
decision. [Ref. l:p. 15-23]
The SSA will review the SSEB proposal evaluations and
the recommendations of the SSAC for completeness. After
any additional questions have been answered or
clarifications received, the SSA will make the source
selection decision.
E. SOURCE SELECTION BID PROTEST FOR INADEQUATE COST
REALISM
When the source selection decision has been made, the
government has the responsibility to promptly notify each
offeror whose proposal was not selected for award.
The notification shall include-
(i) The number of offerors solicited
(ii) The number of proposal received
(iii) The name and address of each offeror receiving an
award
(iv) The items, quantities and unit prices of each
award (if the number of items or other factors
makes listing unit prices impracticable, only the
total contract price need be furnished) and
(v) In general terms, the reason the offeror's proposal
was not accepted, unless the price information in
(iv) above readily reveals the reason. [Ref .1 :p.
15-42]
At this point, unsuccessful offerors have the right to
protest the proposed contract award by filing a protest
with the contracting officer or the Comptroller General. A
belief that the government conducted inadequate cost
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realism analysis is one reason of many possible reasons for
filing such a protest.
Decisions by the Comptroller General in cost realism
based bid protests have normally hinged on the informed
judgement rule. The informed judgement rule is a
requirement for the contracting officer to make an analysis
of proposed costs that is sufficient for making a
supportable judgement that the proposed costs are
realistic.
If cost and technical analyses have been performed to
the degree that a source selection decision can be made
that is both reasonable and consistent with the evaluation
factors contained in the solicitation, then the Comptroller
General will most likely consider the decision an informed
judgment.
Three points should be kept in mind. First, the
informed judgment rule is a flexible not a fixed
standard. What constitutes inadequate cost realism
analysis in one set of circumstances may be adequate cost
analysis in another ... .Second, the procuring agency's
judgment as to the methods used in developing the
government's cost estimate and the conclusions
reached. . .are entitled to great weight since the
procurement agencies are in the best position to
determine the realism of costs. .. .Third, a cost realism
determination will be considered reasonable if it is
based on an informed judgment that the proposed costs are
realistic. .. .An informed judgment results from
consideration of a number of different factors, i.e.
independent audits, government's statistics or similar
contracts for similar services. By considering these and
other factors, the Contracting Officer may develop and
document the rational basis necessary for a cost realism




This chapter discussed at when and where cost realism
issues must be considered during the source selection
process. First, planning for cost realism occurs when the
source selection plan is prepared by determining those
proposal evaluation factors which will be used. Second,
the realism of proposed costs and technical performance are
considered during the proposal evaluation process, whether
or not a formal cost realism analysis takes place.
Finally, the source selection decision is made based on a
determination that the selected source is best able to meet
the government's solicitation requirements, cost, technical
and other factors considered. The possibililty that a bid
protest will be filed based on inadequate cost realism
analysis always exists. However, the likelihood of an
adverse Comptroller General decision is reduced as long as
the source selection decision is a supportable judgment
based on an adequate cost realism analysis.
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IV. COST REALISM UTILIZATION IN THE DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter reviews how cost realism is utilized in
the Department of the Navy. The chapter begins with a
discussion of cost realism requirements and guidance as
established by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the
Navy, Shipbuilding and Logistics (ASN S&L). The chapter
then introduces the cost realism practices of the Navy's
three major system commands: Naval Sea Systems Command
(NAVSEA), Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) and the Space
and Naval Warfare Systems Command (SPAWAR).
B. ASN (S&L) COST REALISM UTILIZATION
There was no formally established Navy-wide cost
realism guidance in effect at the time of this study. The
closest thing to Navy-wide guidance available is the Cost
Realism Handbook for Assuring More Realistic Contractor
Cost Proposals promulgated by the Navy Office for
Acquisition Research:
The handbook is about source selection cost evaluation
for competitive, cost reimbursable contracts with
particular emphasis on assuring more realistic contractor
cost proposals. It is intended as a practical guide and
reference for program management personnel and source
selection personnel.
The handbook discusses the source selection process and
the necessity for adequate cost analysis to assure the
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realism of contractor cost proposals. Techniques and
procedures are presented for conducting cost realism
analysis, but they are advisory only and not mandatory for
source selection decisions.
The handbook goes into great detail on some of the
different methods available for scoring cost realism. The
thrust of the handbook's cost realism scoring methodology
is the development of an unbiased scoring model against
which all cost proposals can be compared with a clear
winner emerging. Where the handbook appears to be
incomplete is in its treatment of contractor cost proposals
in comparison to the government's cost estimate. The
difference between the contractor's cost proposal and the
government's cost estimate determines the cost realism
score with no allowance noted for positive or negative
scores.
As an example of the handbook's proposed scoring
method, a contractor proposal that is within plus or minus
five percent of the government estimate could be awarded a
maximum score. For a $20 million government estimate, this
would mean the contractor's proposal can be between $19 and
$21 million. This presents a problem of contract award.
If the government awards the contract for any amount less
than the $20 million government estimate, and the estimate
was accurate, then there will most likely be a cost growth
of $1 million in contract completion costs. If the
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contract is awarded for an amount greater than the
government estimate, two questions arise. First, how can a
fair and reasonable price determination be made at an
amount higher than the government estimate? Second,
assuming the contractor manages to the contract price, does
the amount of the contract which exceeds the government
estimate constitute additional profit and is this a
violation of existing profit policy? [Ref. 6]
C. NAVSEA COST REALISM UTILIZATION
1 . Introduction
NAVSEA uses cost realism analysis to assist the
source selection decison making process in awarding cost
reimbursable ship repair overhaul contracts. [Ref. 7]
NAVSEA obtains ship repair overhauls through what
could best be described as a two step process. In the
first step, potential offerors propose against a notional
specification work package that represents NAVSEA 's best
estimate of the work effort which will be required during
the ship repair overhaul. Contractor proposals are
evaluated and scored in accordance with the evaluation
factors contained in the RFP. Included among these
evaluation factors are factors for cost realism and cost to
government. After all proposals have been evaluated and
scored, the winning offeror is chosen to receive the ship
repair overhaul award. At this point, step two of the
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process begins with finalization of the ship repair
specification package and the commencement of negotiations
(sole-source) for the terms, conditions and price for the
actual ship repair overhaul contract. [Ref. 7]
2 . Cost Realism Analyses Performed
NAVSEA's evaluation of a proposal begins with the
selection of a sample of work items from the notional
specification package for in depth evaluation. This
selection of sample work items usually represents that ten
percent of the work package items that have the highest
value. [Ref. 7]
Evaluation of the selected work items is based upon
the evaluator's review of the contractor's back-up data
used to support the proposed material and manhours of labor
to complete the work item. If the backup data fully
supports the contractor ' s proposed material and labor
figures in both quantity and quality, no adjustment to the
proposal is necessary. If the backup data does not
adequately support the contractor ' s proposed material or
labor figures, the proposal is adjusted where required.
The necessity for adjustment and the level of adjustment
taken is a subjective determination made by the NAVSEA
evaluator(s). [Ref. 7]
Evaluated and adjusted, if necessary, work item
cost estimates are compared to the contractor's proposed
work item estimate, and any difference becomes the
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adjustment factor for that work item. The adjustment
factors for all work items evaluated are then accumulated,
and a cumulative adjustment factor is determined. The
cumulative adjustment factor is then applied to the
contractor's proposal resulting in an adjusted proposal,
which also becomes the cost to government estimate. The
percent difference between the original proposal and the
adjusted proposal is used to score cost realism. [Ref. 7]
Cost to government scoring is based upon a ranking
of all adjusted proposals, from lowest to highest. The
proposal resulting in the lowest estimated cost to
government receives the highest score with subsequent
scores decreasing as cost to government increases. [Ref. 7]
Scores for cost realism and cost to government are
weighted and combined with the weighted scores for other
evaluation factors. The final scores for all offerors are
then compared, and the highest scoring offeror is selected
for contract award. [Ref. 7]
D. NAVAIR COST REALISM UTILIZATION
1. Introduction
NAVAIR uses cost realism analysis to assist the
source selection decision making process in awarding cost
reimbursable contracts. [Ref. 8]
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2. Cost Realism Analysis Performed
NAVAIR's evaluation of contractor proposals results
in a thorough, critical review of every proposal received
in response to an RFP. [Ref. 8]
NAVAIR evaluators review each element of the WBS
for completeness, adequacy and supportability. The
determination of a contractor's capability to perform the
effort contained in a proposal is made based upon a review
of the proposal, prior performance of the contractor on
similar efforts and, in some cases, prior performance of
other contractors on similar efforts. The objective of
NAVAIR's critical review is the development of an
independent estimate of what the product will most probably
cost the government if manufactured by the contractor.
This most probable cost becomes the government estimate and
when compared to the contractor's proposal forms the basis
for a determination regarding the cost realism of the
contractor's proposal. [Ref. 8]
The information developed regarding cost realism of
the contractor's proposal is provided to the SSAC along
with all other data generated during the proposal
evaluation process. The SSAC, after considering evaluation
reports on all offerors, makes an award recommendation to
the SSA. [Ref. 8]
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SPAWAR uses cost realism analysis to assist the
source selection decision making process in awarding cost
reimbursable contracts. [Ref. 9]
2 Cost Realism Analysis Performed
Among the Navy's three systems commands, SPAWAR
alone has developed detailed procedures for the conduct of
cost realism analysis on contractor proposals.
The procedure begins with the decision to include a
requirement for cost realism analysis and scoring in the
source selection plan. [Ref. 9] Contractors are advised in
the RFP that cost realism analysis will be performed
through the inclusion of the clause:
REALISM OF COST OR PRICE PROPOSALS (M-74 MAY)
An offeror's proposal is presumed to represent his best
efforts to respond to the solicitation. Any
inconsistency, whether real or apparent, between promised
performance, and cost or price, should be explained in
the proposal. For example, if the intended use of new
and innovative production techniques is the basis for an
abnormally low estimate, the nature of these techniques
and their impact on cost or price should be explained;
or, if a corporate policy decision has been made to
absorb a portion of the estimated cost, that should be
stated in the proposal. Any significant inconsistency,
if unexplained, raises a fundamental issue of the
offeror's understanding of the nature and scope of the
work required and of his financial ability to perform the
contract, and may be grounds for rejection of the
proposal. The burden of proof as to cost credibility
rests with the offeror.
Upon receipt of a contractor's proposal, a careful
and complete evaluation of the proposal is made by the
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SPAWAR evaluation team. Each element of the WBS is
examined for completeness, adequacy and supportability.
Comparisons are made between the contractor's proposed
costs for material, labor, overhead and known costs for
similar efforts by this contractor, or other contractors on
similar efforts. Adjustments are made to the contractor's
proposal reflecting those changes the SPAWAR evaluators
believe necessary to make the proposal more realistic. The
adjusted proposal then becomes the SPAWAR estimate. The
goal of the SPAWAR evaluation is to determine whether the
contractor has the capability to perform the required
effort and what the cost of this effort will be. [Ref. 10]
To score cost realism, the contractor's cost
proposal and the SPAWAR cost estimate are plotted on the
cost realism scoring rule table established for the
procurement, and a score is awarded. The cost realism
score becomes a part of the overall score for the proposal,
as delineated in the source selection plan, and the
proposal with the highest overall score is awarded the
contract. [Ref. 10]
3. The SPAWAR Cost Realism Scoring Rule
As previously pointed out, the difference between
the contractor's cost proposal and the SPAWAR cost estimate
decides the cost realism score as determined by the cost
realism scoring rule. The principle surrounding the cost
realism scoring rule is very simple, as demonstrated in
Figure 4.1. [Ref. 10]
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Source: Adapted from [Ref. 10]
Figure 4.1
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The SPAWAR cost estimate ( S ) determines the
position on the graph where the maximum score can be
earned. At predetermined distances from the SPAWAR cost
estimate are the points B and B' where the minimum score
will be earned. When the contractor's cost proposal (C) is
plotted, the score associated with the difference (S-C) is
determined by the line BAB'. The closer a contractor's
cost proposal comes to equalling the SPAWAR cost estimate,
the more the score approaches the maximum. The reverse is
also true. As the contractor's cost proposal moves away
from the SPAWAR cost estimate, the score approaches the
minimum.
The shape of the line BAB' associated with the cost
realism scoring rule is dependent upon the particular
procurement under consideration and the assumptions
associated with it. Figure 4.2 represents the more common
shapes used consisting of the triangle, trapezoid, stepped
and curve. [Ref. 10]
The triangle is a simple scoring rule to determine
and plot. Between B or B ' and S the score for C is
proportional to the difference between S and C.
The trapezoid scoring rule allows a small cost
range to define the SPAWAR cost estimate where different
cost proposals can earn the maximum score. This scoring
rule recognizes the uncertainty which can surround the
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Common Cost Realism Scoring Rule Shapes
TRIANGLE TRAPEZOID
STEPPED CURVE
Source: Adapted from [Ref. 10]
Figure 4.2
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development of the government ' s cost estimate and allows
credit for this uncertainty.
The stepped scoring rule takes the trapezoid one
step further by assigning the same score to a range. The
problems associated with this rule are twofold. First, the
stepped scoring rule could assign quite different scores to
two contractors whose cost proposals have similar degrees
of cost realism (i.e. the two scores straddle a step
break). Second, the stepped scoring rule could assign the
same score to two contractors whose cost proposals have
quite different degrees of cost realism (i.e. the two
scores are at opposite ends of a step plateau).
The use of the curve scoring rule, such as the
normal bell shaped curve, provides an approximation to the
triangle and trapezoid scoring rules.
As previously stated, the type and shape of the
cost realism scoring rule utilized in proposal evaluation
is largely determined by the nature of the procurement.
The scoring spread between the maximum score ( S ) and the
minimum score (B or B') is usually around 20 percent. The
belief is that any cost proposal that is more than 20
percent away from a carefully prepared SPAWAR estimate
raises fundamental questions about the contractor's
understanding of the contract requirements and hence the
cost realism of the proposal [Ref. 10]. Of course, this is
not to say that a scoring spread in excess of twenty
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Skewed Cost Realism Scoring Rule Shapes
SKEWED TRIANGLE SKEWED TRAPEZOID
SKEWED STEPPED SKEWED CURVE
Source: Adapted from [Ref. 10]
Figure 4.3
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percent cannot be established if the nature of the
procurement requires it.
Another item considered while determining the type
and shape of the cost realism scoring rule is the
distribution of the scoring spread around the SPAWAR cost
estimate. An even, symmetrical distribution is normally
provided, but there can be procurements where the
distribution is skewed as demonstrated in Figure 4.3.
[Ref. 10]
F . SUMMARY
The cost realism approaches taken by the three Navy
systems commands appear very similar. First, each
carefully evaluates contractor cost proposals for
completeness, adquacy and supportability. Then, government
cost estimates are developed using the contractor's
proposal as a basis. Other data as considered desireable
and necessary may be included. Finally, the contractor's
cost proposal is compared to the government's cost estimate
to determine the cost realism of the contractor's cost
proposal. It is in the procedures for scoring cost realism
that the three systems commands differ the most, with only
SPAWAR having developed a rather formal and involved
procedure. The end results for the three systems commands
is the same, however, with the cost realism score being
included as a part of the final score determination of a
contractor's proposal.
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. ANSWERS TO THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS
1
.
Can the cost realism concept be used to improve the
source selection decision making process?
Cost realism requires a source selection decision to
consider the most likely cost of a contractor's effort.
The emphasis given to budgetary control issues makes it
important that a source selection decision consider the
most likely final cost of a procurement before making an
award. With cost realism, the procurement program manager
has a good prediction of what the budgetary requirements
for the program will be.
2 What is cost realism?
Cost realism is the methodology by which a contractor's
cost proposal is evaluated during the source selection
process to determine, with some degree of accuracy and
fairness, whether or not it is a realistic estimate of the
actual costs, assuming no changes to the government's




At what points and under what circumstances may cost
realism become an issue in the source selection
process?
First, during the development of the source selection
plan when planning for cost realism is first considered.
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The cost realism methodology to be employed must be capable
of giving adequate consideration to the various risks
associated with the procurement while providing a realistic
estimate of the procurement's actual costs. Second, how
cost realism will be weighted and scored in the source
selection plan may become an issue dependent upon the other
requirements of the procurement and the capabilities of the
potential offerors. As competing proposals are evaluated
and considered essentially equal in the other evaluation
factors, (i.e. technical, management, schedule, cost), cost
realism may become the determining factor. An inadequate
cost realism analysis could result in award to an offeror
whose proposal is not the most advantageous to the
government and the protest of that award by the
unsuccessful offeror(s).
4. How can cost realism best be utilized in the source
selection process?
Cost realism can best be utilized as an evaluation
factor by the SSA in making the source selection decision.
While performing a cost realism analysis the contractor's
proposal receives a detailed evaluation that provides an
estimate of the most likely cost of the contractor's
proposal. The cost realism score provides an invaluable
method to compare different proposals and also provides a
solid basis upon which to defend a source selection
decision if that should become necessary.
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B. CONCLUSIONS
The following conclusions were developed as a result of
this research effort.
Cost realism analysis when adequately performed may
assist the Source Selection Authority in making an
informed judgement source selection decision.
As discussed, cost realism can be one of many
evaluation factors considered by the SSA in making a source
selection decision. As competing proposals become more
equal in non-cost related evaluation factors (i.e.
technical, management, schedule), the cost related
evaluation factors increase in importance as potentially
deciding factors. The necessity for an informed judgement
with regard to the cost related evaluation factors
increases the probability that a source selection decision
will be supportable and defensible.
An adequate cost realism analysis requires a thorough and
complete review of all aspects of a contractor's proposal
to develop a costing baseline for the government
estimate.
It is in comparison against the evaluated government
estimate that the cost realism of a contractor's proposal
is determined. The government estimate is developed
through a careful and complete evaluation of the elements
of cost (material, labor, overhead), which make up the
contractor's cost proposal.
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Cost realism is an excellent forecaster of what a program
will most likely cost; however, cost realism is not a
guarantee of what the program's final cost will be .
The government estimate of a contractor's most likely
cost is still just an estimate. It is subject to the risks
inherent to most cost reimbursable procurements: schedule,
risk, design risk and production risk. If all risk could
be eliminated from a program, there would be no need for a
cost reimbursable contract award. Bids could be taken from
potential offerors, and the award would be made to the
lowest cost bidder. Since risk exists, there is the
distinct possibility that a program will experience cost
growth changes to the estimated final cost.
C. RECOMMENDATIONS
The following recommendations are relevant from this
research effort.
A standard methodology for determining the cost realism
of a contractor's proposal should be established and
required for all cost reimbursable contract awards .
The FAR and service implementing directives and
instructions should be revised to give specific guidance on
determining the cost realism of a contractor's proposal.
Developing standards for cost realism analysis and
requiring a cost realism determination for contractor
proposals will ensure that source selection decisions are
informed judgments.
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Cost realism should be used for any procurement where the
contractor is required to provide cost and pricing data.
Sole source negotiations for a cost reimbursable
contract could use cost realism analysis to assist in
determining a fair and reasonable price for the
procurement
.
D. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
A study should be conducted to evaluate the optimum
characteristics of cost realism scoring rules and the
differing procurement circumstances under which their use
can be maximized.
A study should be conducted to determine how cost
realism is evaluated in other government agencies.
A study should be conducted to review the effect cost
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